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INTRODUCTION
History will look back at June 2, 2003 as an important moment in
American media policy making.
On that day, the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) voted controversially to relax
broadcast ownership limits after completing a mandatory review of its
1
regulations. It was not a routine set of rule changes, but a striking
change in the structure of the media system. The decision opened
up cross-media ownership in the same market, inviting newspapers
and broadcasters to operate under one roof in every major city. It
also permitted a substantially increased media concentration in local
∗
Ben Scott served as a legislative fellow in telecommunications policy in the
office of Representative Bernie Sanders (I-VT) from June 2003 through May 2004.
He is a doctoral student in the Institute of Communications Research, University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The author would like to acknowledge the exceptional
work of his colleagues on the staff of Congressman Sanders.
Much of the information provided in this essay was the result of Mr. Scott's firsthand knowledge of events acquired while working with Congressman Sanders. The
Congressman played a leadership role in the debate over media ownership in 2003, a
role which placed his staff in the midst of a highly detailed and lengthy legislative
process. As a result, Mr. Scott was a participant in many internal staff meetings,
briefing sessions, and inter-office communications which tracked and influenced the
various legislative vehicles as they advanced through the Congress.
1. See Stephen Labaton, Regulators Ease Rules Governing Media Ownership, N.Y.
TIMES, June 3, 2003, at A1 (reporting a split, party-line vote in which the three
Republican members of the FCC voted in favor of the changes and the two
Democratic commissioners dissented).
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and national television markets, tilting market conditions to favor
larger firms and conglomerates. The new rules would permit one
company in one city to own three television (“TV”) stations, eight
radio stations, the daily newspaper, and the cable system. In his
dissenting statement, Commissioner Michael Copps called it “the
granddaddy of all reviews. It sets the direction for how the next
review will get done and for how the media will look for many years
2
to come.”
3
Public response to the new rules was overwhelmingly negative,
and, in turn, congressional response’ was swift and vocal. Through
the final six months of 2003, in one of the most bitterly divided
4
congressional sessions in recent memory, a campaign was waged to
5
reverse the rule changes made by the FCC. Remarkably, the policies
and regulations which shape the media system became political issues
6
for the American people. Arguably, this had not happened for
seventy years since the FCC was formed and the modern system of
broadcast governance was established by the Communications Act of
7
1934. Even more remarkably, it was not a partisan effort. From
8
Senator Trent Lott (R-MS) and the National Rifle Association
9
10
to Representative Bernie Sanders (I-VT)
and
(“NRA”)
2. Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, dissenting, Regarding the 2002
Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, at 4 (June 1, 2003) [hereinafter Statement of Copps], available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/ edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-235047A9.pdf.
3. See Tom Shales, Michael Powell and the FCC: Giving Away the Marketplace of
Ideas, WASH. POST, June 2, 2003, at C01 (describing the extensive opposition to the
rule changes by a wide-ranging number of individuals and organizations).
4. See Helan Dewar, Democrats Forced to Work on Margins, WASH. POST, Dec. 22,
2003, at A06 (discussing the absence of partisanship in Congress as setting the stage
for an even more bitter session in 2004).
5. See generally ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, THE PROBLEM OF THE MEDIA 252-295
(2004) (discussing the uprising of 2003 in opposition to the ownership rules).
6. John Nichols, Congress Rebuffs the FCC, THE NATION, Aug. 18, 2003, at 36
(describing the organization of grassroots campaigns in opposition to the FCC rule
change).
7. See 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-615 (2000).
See generally ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND
DEMOCRACY: THE BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928-1935 (1993)
(describing the contest between the early broadcasting corporations, the
government, the public, and a coalition of public interest advocates over how the
broadcast spectrum would be regulated by the government in the early days of
radio).
8. See John Nichols & Robert W. McChesney, Standing Up to the FCC, THE
NATION, June 23, 2003, at 5 (reporting Senator Lott’s statement that “[a] lot of
Republicans, in fact, probably most of the Republicans in Congress, would not agree
with this decision.”).
9. See Thane Peterson, Why the FCC Needs a New Chief, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Sept. 8,
2003, at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/sep2003/nf2003098_6743_
db028. htm (noting the NRA’s opposition to the rule changes) (on file with the
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11

MoveOn.org, the entire political spectrum was represented in a
strange-bedfellows coalition of opposition.
But, from a longer term perspective of media policy making, the
second of June was not a wildly aberrant moment in U.S. media
regulation, though it was an abrupt change of pace. Nor did the
ruling necessarily have to become the political catalyst that it did,
knocking over a row of dominoes that awakened the American public
and its Congress in dramatic fashion. In retrospect, it appears, the
day of the vote was a flashpoint where the political objectives of
media policy most recently reaffirmed by the architects of the
12
Telecommunications Act of 1996 collided with the sensibilities
(political and otherwise) of the American public. Simply put, the
direction of communications policy was leading steadily to the
concentration of media control in the hands of a few large
corporations.
The American people and a majority of their
representatives concluded that it was not such a good idea. The
conflict produced the most notable congressional battle over media
policy in generations.
Why did it happen in 2003? How and why was the congressional
move to reverse the rule changes sustained? How and why did it
ultimately stall? Will the issue return to the fray in the future? These
are the questions at issue in the comments that follow. In distilled
form, the primary arguments that will seek to offer some answers are:
(1) the 2003 debate over media ownership marks an important
publicizing of media regulation as a political issue; (2) the power
politics of the federal regulatory process and policies that favor
deregulation and corporate interests are now opposed by legitimate
counter-forces, serious scrutiny of the process, and a policy agenda of
public service and accountability; (3) the political story in this contest
is not exclusively the emergence of grassroots pressure which leveled
the playing field in media policy-making, but also the politics of a
powerful minority that denied public and congressional majorities;
and (4) despite failing to achieve legislative results, public interest
media policy has captured public momentum and congressional

American University Law Review).
10. See John Nichols & Robert W. McChesney, FCC: Public Be Damned, THE
NATION, June 2, 2003, at 5 (noting that Representative Saunders and others
circulated a letter to Democratic congressmen asking the FCC to postpone the vote
on the rule changes and seek additional public comment).
11. See id. (describing that this web based advocacy organization is urging its
“media corps” to protest the FCC’s vote on the rule changes).
12. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104. 110 Stat. 56 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.).
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attention to such a remarkable degree that legislators will certainly
continue to pursue a populist agenda on ownership as well as other
media issues.
I.

FRAMING THE MEDIA OWNERSHIP DEBATE

As in most legislative clashes, the media ownership debate was
about conflicting policy objectives. Quite typically, this policy conflict
was played out through a series of political maneuvers as members of
Congress jockeyed for position in the legislative process, worked to
attract and shape media attention, curried favor with interest groups,
negotiated pressures within their party structures, and marshaled
public pressure to bring support to their side of the cause. All of this
was done in hopes of winning a legislative result. Because the 108th
Congress is marked by extreme partisanship, it is tempting to suggest
(as some have) that this debate was only about politics, that there
were no policy ideas beneath the opposition’s attack and that it was
purely a counter-factual campaign against the FCC that happened to
13
serve political purposes. It is true that the political climate dictated
the manner in which Congress reacted to the June 2 decision. It
confused and shrouded the matter in partisan acrimony on Capitol
Hill, and it ultimately led to an outlandish compromise worked out
by Republicans. But, it would be a mistake to conclude this was the
primary meaning of the contest. In fact, it would miss the most
significant development in media policy making in generations: the
genesis of a new set of policy ideas to serve public interest media
objectives supported by a bipartisan coalition of lawmakers and
citizens.
The emergence of these new principles of policy making to
challenge the status quo stands in contrast to the scant opposition of
14
the past. For decades, there has been one dominant set of policies
driving governance of the media system: gradual deregulation, free
market economics, and the reduction of direct public accountability.
The prevailing idea has been to use the FCC’s regulatory powers to
set and reset market conditions over time to favor large, vertically
15
integrated firms. Producing market efficiencies has been conflated
13. See Jube Shriver, Jr., et al., FCC Ruling Puts Rivals on the Same Wavelength; Public
Opinion, Political Self-Interest Spur Many in Congress to Unite Against New Media Rules,
L.A. TIMES, June 9, 2003, at A1 (suggesting that special interest groups such as the
NRA and NOW influenced the political approach).
14. See generally HUGH R. SLOTTEN, RADIO AND TELEVISION REGULATION (2000)
(tracing the role of the federal government as the guardian of public interest during
the developmental periods of the broadcast industry).
15. Although it may appear that deregulation cedes public control to the forces
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with the goal of serving the public interest. Other policy solutions
have been basically off the legislative table, just as the entire issue has
been off the public radar. This issue has rarely been judged
politically significant by the usual conveners of public discussion—the
news media, political parties, and educators—and most people are
unaware of even the basic facts of media regulation. A June 2002
survey demonstrated that only thirty-one percent of Americans were
aware that the broadcast airwaves are owned by the public, and
eighty-nine percent were unaware that broadcasters receive their
16
station licenses for free in exchange for public service.
Yet, when the FCC opened its biennial review of the broadcast
ownership rules in the fall of 2002, the political climate on the issue
changed. The standard deregulatory agenda met with stiff resistance.
Further, a set of ideas long advocated by only a handful of public
interest groups and academics percolated to the surface across the
political spectrum. This opposition put forward three simple claims:
(1) control over the media system was already in the hands of too few;
(2) the FCC should not permit further concentration of ownership;
and (3) Congress should reevaluate how the public regulates its
17
media system to find ways to better serve the interests of the people.
These concepts had enormous resonance for millions of Americans
for a broad assortment of reasons, and became the foundation of
what may become a new congressional policy platform. Remarkably,
all three would hold together and retain bipartisan support
throughout the hotly contested political fight.
Precisely why this happened at this moment in time is unknown,
but a few contributing factors can be identified. First, it was the
of the market, it is worthwhile to point out that this is a misnomer. The broadcasting
industry is built on public grants of monopoly spectrum rights. Licenses are
administered strictly or loosely, in ways that favor some industry players over others.
Loose regulation is not deregulation; it chooses winners and losers just as surely as
strict regulation. It unleashes market forces that have very predictable results:
consolidation and conglomeration. Deregulation, when used in this essay, should be
interpreted to mean regulation that favors players with natural market advantages
such as size, capital, and vertical integration of production and distribution facilities.
See generally ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY 146-59 (2000)
(clarifying the nature of the current media deregulation as favoring existing large
media corporations rather than promoting competition).
16. See ALLIANCE FOR BETTER CAMPAIGNS, POLITICAL STANDARD—NATIONWIDE
SURVEY FINDS THAT MOST AMERICANS SUPPORT FREE AIR TIME, DON’T REALIZE THE
PUBLIC OWNS THE AIRWAVES (June 2002), at http://www.bettercampaigns.org/
standard/display.php?StoryID=238 (last visited Jan. 22, 2004) (on file with the
American University Law Review) (providing the results of a poll conducted by the
Pew Research Foundation).
17. See Statement of Copps, supra note 2, at 9 (illustrating the potential problems
of the FCC’s decision, and noting the problems that have already occurred in radio
ownership since the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996).
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initial review conducted during the George W. Bush administration.
The White House made plain its desire for the accelerated
18
dismantling of government controls in the media marketplace.
Consequently, the review which opened in September 2002 seemed
likely to be a departure from the beaten path of gradual
deregulation. Several large media companies filed comments with
19
the FCC arguing that ownership rules should be totally eliminated.
Second, some of the regulations made during the previous review
20
had been vacated or remanded by the courts. This led many to
believe that radical change was necessary to satisfy new legal
requirements.
Third, the FCC’s Chairman, Michael Powell, held only a single
21
public hearing on the matter.
This prompted the minority
commissioners, led by Michael Copps, to begin touring the country
to speak at a series of highly publicized, well attended, and unofficial
22
hearings.
Fourth, the American media system was experiencing a crisis in
confidence directly linked to deregulatory economics.
The
deregulation of the radio industry in 1996 seemed to have gone
wrong thus permitting Clear Channel to explode from forty stations
to more than 1200, and precipitating a decline in local control over
23
programming. FCC Chairman Powell, testifying before the Senate
Commerce Committee, conceded that he was “concerned about

18. See Nichols & McChesney, supra note 10, at 5 (noting that the Bush
administration applauded Chairman Powell’s decision to hold the June 2, 2003 vote).
19. See Yochi J. Dreazen, Media Seek to End Ownership Rules, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3,
2003, at A8 (identifying the commenting companies as Viacom, General Electric, and
Fox Entertainment Group).
20. See Sinclair Broad. Group v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding
that the local ownership rule is overall constitutional; however, the definition of
“voices” is “arbitrary and capricious,” thus remanding the rule to the FCC); see also
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (vacating
the FCC’s decision not to rescind or amend the National Television Station
Ownership (“NTSO”) Rule or the Cable/Broadcast Cross-Ownership (“CBSO”) Rule,
remanding the retainment of the NTSO to the FCC, and repealing the CBSO).
Notably, the court did not rule that the ownership regulations could not be justified.
It ruled that they had not been justified. Id. at 1051. This is not surprising, given that
the FCC, as mandated by the 1996 Act, was instructed to thoroughly review and
justify its ownership rules every two years. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56, 111-12 (2003). This pace of study is arguably
unsustainable by any federal agency and is considered by many lawmakers to be a
mistake.
21. See Nichols & McChesney, supra note 10, at 5 (noting that Chairman Powell
declined to participate in several other unofficial hearings that other FCC
commissioners attended).
22. Peterson, supra note 9.
23. Statement of Copps, supra note 2, at 9.
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24

media concentration, particularly in radio.” Perhaps more visible,
high profile journalists were publicly expressing their alarm that
economic pressures were reducing the quality of the American news
25
media and degrading the quality of the public debate.
Finally, in the early months of 2003, the country prepared and
began a controversial war in Iraq, an event which sparked criticism
26
over the quality and diversity of media coverage. As a result, there
was a great deal more than the usual inside-the-Beltway hue and cry
when the June 2003 ruling began to loom on the horizon. Perennial
public interest advocates like Consumers Union, Center for Digital
Democracy, and the Consumer Federation of America were no
longer alone in contesting the FCC. Beside them stood unlikely
partners such as the NRA, Parents Television Council, and the
National Council of Churches. These organizations launched a
highly successful effort to educate concerned citizens and direct
attention to the FCC proceeding. By June 2, over 750,000 individual
petitions reached the FCC, asking the Commissioners to eschew
27
further media concentration.
Despite the opposition’s visibility, the central message conveyed by
that media attention was limited to stopping the FCC from loosening
ownership limits. The purpose of advocating this position and the
expanded outlook of their policy objectives remained murky. The
unified call for public service was blurred by the various priorities of
the different groups.
Consequently, when the June ruling prompted a further
intensification of the outcry and a boiling congressional backlash, but
not a clear policy alternative, some interpreted the contest as a
political attack by an embattled minority, not a legitimate policy
challenge. For example, The Christian Science Monitor suggested that
basically this fight was about lawmakers protecting local media voices
28
because they could exert more influence on them during elections.
Additionally, a Wall Street Journal editorial portrayed the ownership

24. Robert W. McChesney & John Nichols, Media Democracy’s Moment, THE
NATION, Feb. 24, 2003, at 17.
25. See generally LEONARD DOWNIE JR. & ROBERT G. KAISER, THE NEWS ABOUT THE
NEWS: AMERICAN JOURNALISM IN PERIL (2002) (book-length media critique by two
Washington Post editors); INTO THE BUZZSAW: LEADING JOURNALISTS EXPOSE THE MYTH
OF A FREE PRESS (Kristina Borjesson, ed. 2002 ).
26. See, e.g., Robert S. Pritchard, The Pentagon is Fighting—and Winning—the Public
Relations War, USA TODAY MAG., July 1, 2003, at 12 (describing the criticism that the
Pentagon only allowed a positive portrayal of the war through embedding journalists
with soldiers).
27. Statement of Copps, supra note 2, at 7.
28. Tuning Out the FCC, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 25, 2003, at 10.
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debate as a covert effort by Democrats to suppress conservative radio
29
Critics heightened misperceptions throughout the
talk shows.
debate claiming that the public simply did not understand the
technical and legal details of media regulation, and that members of
Congress saw a political opportunity to champion a popular issue by
manipulating public viewpoints. Viacom chief Mel Karmazin said this
about the backlash: “We’re troubled by it, it’s political, it’s not
30
motivated by fact.” Chairman Powell commented in June that critics
had a “dramatic misunderstanding of the substance of what was at
31
issue,” and he concluded later in the fall that “people ran an outside
political campaign against the commission,” a campaign which
32
ignored the facts.
This set of claims, purporting that the ownership debate had more
to do with political chicanery than a good-faith response to the facts
of policy making, are misguided. There are two central factors which
support this point; an unshakeable bipartisanship, and the serious
congressional scrutiny of the policy objectives.
Undeniably, the coalition began bipartisan and remains bipartisan.
It is not a creation of the Democrats, nor is it motivated by
ideological rancor. The perceived likelihood of a reduction in
localism, diversity, and public control over the media system is
unpopular across the political spectrum. If this was a political
campaign against the Republican administration and the FCC, it
would be hard to explain why so many Republicans remained
supportive of proposals to roll back the FCC’s decision.
The politics to which they are responding belong to their
constituents. Columnist William Safire summed it up in the days
before the decision:
“The concentration of power—political,
corporate, media, cultural—should be anathema to conservatives.
The diffusion of power through local control, thereby encouraging
individual participation, is the essence of federalism and the greatest
33
expression of democracy.” Former Senator Jesse Helms of North
Carolina seconded these sentiments in a letter to Senator Trent Lott
on the eve of a key vote. He wrote, “I can think of no reason to allow

29. The Stop Rush Campaign, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2003, at A10.
30. Todd Shields, Nets Try to Regain Ground, MEDIAWEEK.com, July 28, 2003, at
http://www.mediaweek.com/mediaweek/headlines/article_display.jsp?vnu_content
_ id=1942827 (on file with the American University Law Review).
31. Stephen Labaton, F.C.C. Chief Talks of Frustration and Surprise, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 2003, at C1.
32. Id.
33. William Safire, The Great Media Gulp, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2003, at A24
(emphasis added).
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fewer companies to own more and more of the media! Media
ownership is a bipartisan issue that commands a close review by
34
Democrats and Republicans.”
Senator Lott took this message to the Senate floor to dispel any
notion that reevaluating media deregulation was politically
motivated. In his remarks on September 11, 2003 he emphasized the
two most significant elements of the bipartisan coalition as evidenced
by comments made by both the AFL-CIO and the NRA. “Here is an
interesting thing about this alliance. This is a diverse group, and they
35
generally represent people, individuals.”
If indeed there was a
political campaign involved in the ownership debate, it was
engineered by conservatives and liberals making up a broad crosssection of the American polity.
The idea that the campaign was without a basis in fact or without
policy counterproposals is betrayed by the sentiments and actions of
its congressional leaders. The rejection of the FCC’s rules makes
little sense without a clear intent to revisit the principles and methods
of public media regulation. This conflict marks the reversal of a
consistent policy trend toward deregulation and the point of
departure for new thinking on public service controls in the
marketplace. Any rollback of the FCC rules which was not followed
by further legislative inquiry would amount merely to resetting the
clock to June 1 and resuming the policy directives that produced
June 2. Moreover, it would leave the FCC in a serious mess, faced
with legal remands, review deadlines, and an uncertain directive from
Congress. The baseline conclusion is clear; the effort to reverse the
rule changes was aimed at scrutinizing the method and changing the
policy which produced the changes.
Members of Congress have already begun the process of studying
and shaping the contours of a new, bipartisan media policy platform
of local media control, ownership limits, and public accountability.
The desire to roll back the rule changes was not based on longing for
the pre-June 2 world. Instead, it was based on the understanding that
deregulation policies were failing and needed principled
reconsideration with new policy goals. Senator McCain, in the
September 11 debate on media ownership, stated that, “[w]hether we
agree with them or not, the FCC’s actions are a direct result of the
34. See Letter from former Senator Jesse Helms to Senator Trent Lott (Sept. 15,
2003), at http://www.mediareform.net/multimedia/Helms.pdf (on file with the
American University Law Review). Senator Helms’ to Senator Lott was widely
circulated among Congressional offices.
35. 149 CONG. REC. S11,389 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Lott).
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direction given to it by Congress in the Telecommunications Act of
1996, which should have been called ‘Leave No Lobbyist Behind Act
36
of 1996.’” Senator McCain concluded that, “[i]n short, if the
Congress is unsatisfied with the result of the FCC review, it should
37
step in to provide new direction.” Senator Lott agreed, replying in
the same debate; “I share a lot of [Senator McCain’s] concerns and
questions. I know from my discussions with him, and he knows, we
38
need to do more in this area. . . .” Representative Bernie Sanders
was even more specific, arguing that “[r]olling back the national TV
ownership cap is the first step in this fight. . . . [It] should be
considered a first step in the larger movement to reform the media
system and set the FCC on a regulatory course that serves the public
39
interest not big media companies.”
These sentiments explain why Senator McCain’s Commerce
Committee held eight full committee hearings on the topic of media
40
ownership in 2003.
Senator McCain later referenced the
development of his thinking over the course of the year by saying,
“[a]s a result, I have come to believe that stringent, but reasonable,
41
limits on media ownership may very well be appropriate.”
The
record demonstrates that Congress intends to revisit the issue and
craft new policies. This interest explains the growth of the Public
Broadcasting Caucus to 100 members and the formation of the Sex &
Violence in the Media Caucus—both bipartisan working groups on
media issues in the House of Representatives. In addition, members
of Congress are planning to conduct town meetings in their districts
in states like Vermont, California, and New York.
Congress was not preparing to render the FCC powerless and
without direction. The legislative move to reject the June 2003
changes to the media ownership rules was indicative of the first steps
in the formation of a new policy agenda.
More work was
forthcoming, as by no means did Congress write or debate a
36. 149 CONG. REC. S11,385 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen.
McCain).
37. Id.
38. 149 CONG. REC. S11,387 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Lott).
39. Press Release, Representative Bernie Sanders, Sanders Calls Rollback of FCC
Rules “First Step in Larger Movement” (July 23, 2003), at http://bernie.house.gov/
documents/releases/20030723184339.asp (on file with the American University Law
Review) (quotations omitted).
40. See U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION,
HEARINGS, at http://www.commerce.senate.gov/hearings/index.cfm?cong=108&
sessn=1&subc=58 (last visited Mar. 14, 2004) (listing subject matter and dates of all
full committee hearings).
41. 149 CONG. REC. S11,385 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen.
McCain).
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comprehensive policy proposal. But, it legitimately placed on the
table the idea that public service regulation was not equivalent to
market efficiencies, and might well be in conflict with them. This
idea alone marks a turning point as Congress is now inclined to
pursue untried methods of media regulation by seeking new policies
and a better balance between market forces and public rights. It is
quite fair to state that the contest over whether a rule rejection would
succeed marked a clash between two oppositional policy priorities;
not a policy-less political attack on the status quo.
It is then also fair to ask, if politics did not constitute the driving
force behind the opposition, what role did they play? The role of
politics was indeed a powerful one, but it was primarily involved in
guiding the process, not the substance, of the debate. Opponents of
the FCC sought to keep legislative vehicles for rejecting the rule
changes alive for as long as possible, a difficult task in a Congress led
by FCC supporters and the policies of deregulation. They used the
political advantages of broad public support, an unlikely bipartisan
coalition, and the attractive simplicity of the message of the “public
versus big media.” Conversely, supporters of the rules used the
political power of leadership to block legislation and to leverage
targeted industry lobbying. In addition, GOP leaders pressured
conservative members to withdraw from the coalition, and they
worked to whittle down the winnable objectives of the reformers to
only one of the rule changes.
There is a good case to be made that the most impressive political
power demonstrated in the media ownership debate was not the
force which brought the issue to public attention and onto the
congressional agenda. The most impressive political power was the
force which defeated the rollback—overcoming the weaknesses in the
ruling, repelling the major elements of reform in every shape they
took (despite majority support), engineering a compromise, and
ultimately denying a move toward new policy interests. The shortterm success of the FCC’s defenders was very near total as a result of
their aggressive political tactics.
I suggest there is a great deal of evidence to support this
contention. For example, the FCC and its supporters defended a
record containing substantial flaws in its process and method.
Though Congress performed much of the review with a great deal of
care, there are central elements that are intellectually indefensible.
No matter which policy approach Congress preferred,
methodological problems in the production of data sets and studies
shaping the rules are difficult to ignore. At the very least, they call for
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further review and correction; a process wholly consistent with the
objectives of the reformers and not inconsistent with the arguments
supporting the ruling more generally. Even if the Chairman’s
primary arguments are conceded in their entirety (which they have
42
not been), the presence of serious flaws in the logic, procedure, and
analytical models used by the FCC would pose considerable problems
for opponents of a rule reversal.
The two dissenting commissioners issued lengthy reports
43
articulating many of the rules’ problems.
Consumer advocacy
groups and public interest attorneys brought to light other
44
problems. They later took these arguments before the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit where they won a stay on the
45
implementation of the rules.
The most troublesome problems
included inadequate public hearings, constrained periods of public
review, contradictions in the logic of the ruling, faulty assumptions,
inconsistent application of principles, dubious interpretation of
statistical results, and a disregard for critical comment and data in the
evidentiary record.
The present study does not purport to conduct a systematic review
of the quality of the ruling, but it does seek to provide a few examples
of the most egregious problems demonstrating the weaknesses that
might reasonably justify Congress’s intervention. Commissioner
Copps wrote in his dissent: “Good, sustainable rules are the result of
an open administrative process and a serious attempt to gather all the
relevant facts. Bad rules and legal vulnerability result from an

42. See Statement of Chairman Michael K. Powell, Regarding the 2002 Biennial
Regulatory Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules
Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 18
F.C.C.R. 13,620 (2003) (claiming that: (1) Congress and the courts essentially
mandated deregulatory rule changes; (2) digital media resulted in a dramatic
expansion of media choices and eased the problems of scarcity and diversity; and (3)
over-the-air broadcasting would not long survive without government granted market
advantages).
43. Statement of Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein, dissenting, Regarding the
2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 (June 1, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/DOC-235047A8.pdf; Statement of Copps, supra note 2.
44. See MARK COOPER, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., ABRACADABRA! HOCUS-POCUS!
MAKING MEDIA MARKET POWER DISAPPEAR WITH THE FCC’S DIVERSITY INDEX (2003)
(discussing several problems with the FCC decision, including its flawed reasoning,
faulty reliance on the diversity index and inconsistent logic), at http://cyberlaw.
stanford.edu/blogs/cooper/archives/mediabooke.pdf (on file with the American
University Law Review).
45. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 03-3388, 2003 WL 22052896, at *1
(3d Cir. Sept. 3, 2003) (finding that the proposed broadcast rules would cause
irreparable harm and granting petitioner’s motion to stay the effective date).
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opaque regulatory process and inadequate data. Unfortunately,
46
Data sets were
today’s rules fall into the latter camp.”
47
predominantly proprietary and secretive. The FCC did not release
the information to the public in a timely manner, despite a letter
48
from fifteen senators requesting more transparency. Moreover, the
49
FCC relied on discredited studies to make critical decisions. The
FCC’s central arguments were flawed and contradictory. Specifically,
Copps notes that the FCC prevented two of the top four TV stations
in a market from merging on the grounds of guarding against undue
concentration. The FCC, however, permitted the merger of the top
TV station and the monopoly newspaper, a consolidation far more
50
likely to centralize control over news and information.
A July report issued by Consumers Union and the Consumer
Federation of America noted serious flaws in the FCC’s “diversity
51
index,” a tool used to analyze media markets. The report found that
by applying this tool, which very oddly does not account for market
share in New York City, the Shop at Home Incorporated TV and
Dutchess Community College TV were considered more influential
52
news sources than the New York Times.
The report discovered
similarly troubling anomalies in other markets. The report judged
the ruling harshly:
The Media Ownership Order is riddled with contradictions,
misstatements of empirical fact and unrealistic or unsupported

46. Statement of Copps, supra note 2, at 5.
47. See John Dunbar, A Penchant for Secrecy: Why is the FCC So Determined to Keep Key
Data from the Public?, WELL CONNECTED, May 22, 2003, at http://www.openairwaves.
org/telecom/report.aspx?aid=18 (on file with the American University Law Review)
(criticizing the government’s reliance on private data and invocation of a protection
order to keep the data secret).
48. See Press Release, Consumer’s Union, Two Important Developments in
Debate Over the FCC’s Media Ownership Review: Bipartisan Group of Key Senators
Ask FCC for Full Disclosure Before Revising Media Rules—Small Business
Administration’s Office of Advocacy Faults FCC for Not Properly Considering Impact
on Small Businesses (Apr. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Two Important Developments]
(reporting that Senators Snowe, Dorgan, Hollings, Lott, Hutchison, Inouye, Wyden,
Boxer, Nelson, Cantwell, Lautenberg, Collins, Murray, and Allard signed the letter
sent to Chairman Powell on April 10, 2003), at http://www.consumersunion.
org/telecom/media2-403.htm (on file with the American University Law Review).
49. See generally DEAN BAKER, AFL-CIO DEP’T FOR PROF’L EMPLOYEES, DEMOCRACY
UNHINGED: MORE MEDIA CONCENTRATION MEANS LESS PUBLIC DISCOURSE: A CRITIQUE
OF THE FCC STUDIES ON MEDIA OWNERSHIP (2002) (cataloguing the studies’ specific
flaws, including failure to address the issue of bias in news broadcasts, failure to
examine trends in news quality over time, and adoption of faulty assumptions), at
http://www.dpeaflcio.org/pdf/FCC_Critique.pdf (on file with the American
University Law Review).
50. Statement of Copps, supra note 2, at 13.
51. COOPER, supra note 44, at 4.
52. Id.
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assumptions about market conditions. The inconsistencies occur
within the discussions of each rule, as well as between the
arguments presented for each of the rules. These inconsistencies
and flaws result in an analytic framework that produces absurd
53
results.

Public interest advocates elaborated on many of the problems in a
brief filed with the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
54
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC.
Political backers of the ruling faced an even greater hurdle. Quite
simply, the effort to reverse the FCC ruling had majority support in
Congress, as demonstrated on the record. Both the House and the
Senate passed rollback provisions in committee and in full roll call
votes. In each case, the vast majority of the Democrats lined up with
a significant minority of the Republicans to secure passage, often by a
wide margin. Each highly publicized victory evidenced a rebuke of
the FCC and a step toward a new media policy. Nonetheless, through
a series of procedural maneuvers and political tactics, each of the
legislative vehicles which might have reversed some or part of the
June decision was blocked. In the end, all that remained was a
compromise between Republicans that essentially ignored public
outcry to reverse the entire FCC order, choosing instead to slightly
modify one of the several rule changes. Despite a Congressional
majority, all that stands in the way of the rules going into effect is the
55
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
This is the most important story of the political and policy debates
surrounding media ownership, though it is little told. The White
House and the congressional leaders of the Republican Party
succeeded in deflecting the stated will of the Congress. This is a
remarkable state of affairs. Only a small number of issues saw
Congressional majorities and overwhelming public opinion fail to
produce public law. Arguably, this occurs only with critical issues
with strong ideological divisions. In the first session of the 108th
Congress, this happened with efforts to rescind portions of the
Patriot Act, efforts to legalize the reimportation of prescription drugs
from Canada, and efforts to prevent the alteration of overtime wage
rules. Few issues garnered as much attention and support as these
during the legislative year. That they did not pass into law is an
unfortunate statement about the democratic process in the Congress.
53. Id. at 7.
54. Brief for Citizen Petitioners and Intervenors, Prometheus Radio Project v.
FCC, 2003 WL 22052896 (3d Cir. Oct. 21, 2003) (No. 03-3388), available at
http://www.mediaaccess.org/CitizenPetitionersandIntervenorsBrief.pdf.
55. Prometheus Radio Project, 2003 WL 22052896, at *1.
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But, it is also an indication of how media has become an important
political issue.
In summary, I reassert the following claims. First, far more than
politics motivated the opponents of the June rules. The opponents
had a clear policy objective to reverse the rules and pursue public
interest media policy to guide future review and rule making in the
direction of more substantial public service requirements and
protections. Second, far more than policy arguments lay behind the
relatively successful defense of the FCC’s ruling in Congress. As the
following account will demonstrate, given the majority strength of the
opposition and the deep flaws in the FCC’s ruling, it was the politics
behind the FCC’s policies which allowed them to survive.
II.

THE POLITICAL BATTLE IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

Congress’s response to June 2 played out in three tracks. The first
was the standard route of legislative consideration, moving bills
through the committee system. When that was blocked, amendments
were added to appropriations bills to attempt to achieve a rollback by
56
preventing the FCC from using its funding to implement the rules.
Finally, members attempted to use a rare measure amounting to a
congressional veto of the agency ruling. This is permitted under the
terms of a “resolution of disapproval,” a part of the Congressional
57
Review Act of 1996 (“CRA”). Should it pass, it would nullify the
June ruling entirely.
There was both bipartisan and public support for each of these
measures. On two of the three legislative tracks, the House and
Senate voted for passage, despite opposition from congressional
58
leadership and the White House. The soundness of the policy of
reversal and reconsideration of the FCC rules was not in question in
the public. A July survey conducted by the Pew Research Center
demonstrated that the more people learned about the FCC’s new
rules, the less they liked them. Forty percent of those who knew
nothing about the issue had a negative impression of the ruling.
Fifty-seven percent of those who had some knowledge were
displeased. Of those who said they knew a lot about the FCC ruling,
56. See Joseph C. Anselmo, Senate Committee Toughens Media Ownership Restirctions
in Second Swipe at FCC, CQ WKLY., June 28, 2003, at 1627 (noting a strategy proposed
by Senate leaders opposed to the new rules that would defeat the FCC authorization
bill by attaching amendments unpopular with the broadcasting industry).
57. Congressional Review Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 868
(codified as 5 U.S.C. § 801 (2000)).
58. Jacques Steinberg, House Panel Adds Voice to Opponents Of Media Rule, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 2003, at C1.
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seventy percent felt negatively about it as compared to six percent
59
who saw it as positive.
With this kind of public support, it was no surprise that on the
occasions when Congress voted on these rules, the results endorsed a
rollback by a wide margin. That is not to say it ever had a good
chance of becoming law. This issue depended less on building
majority support for a rule reversal than it did on whether Congress’s
politics and procedures, which places huge power in the hands of the
majority leadership, would allow such a policy to be realized. The
different legislative strategies and the extensive posturing were all
political responses attempting to determine how to advance a policy
that had majority support but lacked leadership consent.
The first legislative response began in early April, before the FCC
60
even issued its order.
Initially, Congress focused its attention
exclusively on the national broadcast ownership limits. The old rule,
set in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, stated that one TV
network could own and operate stations that reached no more than
61
thirty-five percent of the nation’s TV households. The proposed
new rule would raise that cap to forty-five percent. This increase
permitted large broadcast networks, particularly NBC, ABC, CBS, and
FOX, to purchase stations run by affiliates. It also legalized the
acquisitions of Viacom and News Corp, both of whom exceeded the
thirty-five percent limit in anticipation of a rule change.
Two important groups opposed this rule change. The first was the
general public, evidenced by its 750,000 notices of disapproval. The
second group was smaller, but more influential, the National
Association of Broadcasters (“NAB”). NAB, largely representing
regional and local broadcast chains, was generally pleased with the
62
idea of loosening ownership caps. This organization felt, however,
that a forty-five percent cap would tip the balance of power in the
industry toward the networks and away from its primary
59. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, STRONG OPPOSITION TO MEDIA CROSS-OWNERSHIP
EMERGES: PUBLIC WANTS NEUTRALITY AND PRO-AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW (2003), at
http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=188 (on file with the
American University Law Review).
60. See Two Important Developments, supra note 48 (describing the letter sent by
senators to Chairman Powell criticizing lack of proper note and comment period for
the FCC’s proposed ownership rules).
61. Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 202(c)(1)(B), Pub. L. No. 104-104. 110
Stat. 56.
62. See, e.g., Neal Hickey, Power Shift, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar.-Apr. 2003, at
29-30 (noting that most ownership caps restricted the ability of local broadcast
companies to cross-own television stations with radio stations or newspapers, or or
limited the number of radio or television stations that a company could own in a
given market).
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63

constituents. If the networks owned more stations outright, it would
be easier for them to exert influence over advertising rates and
64
programming decisions for non-owned affiliates. NAB leaned on
lawmakers to keep the national cap at thirty-five percent to avoid that
outcome; even as they pressed Congress to endorse the FCC’s
65
removal of the cross-ownership ban.
The House and Senate introduced companion bills with bipartisan
66
support. Each kept the national broadcast cap at thirty-five percent,
though the FCC had yet to change it. In the House, Representative
Richard Burr (R-NC), the Energy Commerce Committee’s ViceChairman, and Representative John Dingell (D-MI), the ranking
Democrat on the committee, introduced H.R. 2052, the Burr-Dingell
67
bill, on May 9.
Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), Chairman of the
Appropriations Committee, and Senator Fritz Hollings (D-SC), the
ranking Democrat on the Commerce Committee, introduced the
68
Stevens-Hollings bill on May 13.
Both bills rapidly picked up
cosponsors. By the time the FCC actually raised the broadcast cap to
forty-five percent, a tenth of the House and Senate was on record in
support of bills to roll it back. Directly after the ruling, over a dozen
senators sponsored a resolution asking that the rules be rescinded on
the grounds that both the process and the conclusions were badly
69
flawed and contrary to the public interest.
On June 12, Representative Bernie Sanders (I-VT) introduced a
more comprehensive bill, H.R. 2462, which amounted to a legislative
reversal of the entire FCC decision, not just the forty-five percent
70
broadcast cap. This bill was designed to move beyond a debate over
the broadcast cap. Its supporters emphasized that the lifting of the
cross-media ownership ban would have a much bigger impact on the
character of the American media system than an increase in the
broadcast ownership cap. Supporters of H.R. 2052 argued that the
expansion of network power in the television sector would result in
63. See id. at 29 (reporting that NAB opposition to the lifting of this cap resulted
in the defection from that organization of large media companies NBC, CBS, and
Fox).
64. See id. (citing a number of examples of networks using their power to force
programming decisions on local affiliates).
65. See id. (quoting NAB’s vice-president Dennis Wharton as opining that “the
thirty-five-percent cap has been good for localism”).
66. H.R. 2052, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 1046, 108th Cong. (2003).
67. H.R. 2052, 108th Cong. (amending the Communications Act of 1934 to
preserve localism and diversity in television programming, prevent monopolies, and
promote competition).
68. S. 1046, 108th Cong.
69. S.J. Res. 17, 108th Cong. (2003).
70. H.R. 2462, 108th Cong. (2003).
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the decline of localism and diversity as national conglomerates took
over programming decisions from local and regional owners. H.R.
2462 supported and extended that position. If conglomerate
ownership of the local television station was harmful to localism and
diversity, certainly the conglomerate ownership of a local television
station and a local newspaper and several local radio stations should
be looked upon as even more harmful. By the end of June,
Representative Sanders had more than sixty cosponsors on his
71
legislation, about half the number held by Burr-Dingell. Both bills
had bipartisan support, though the more limited bill enjoyed a more
balanced following of Republicans and Democrats. At this point, it
was widely thought that the GOP supporters favoring reversal of the
FCC ruling would not look beyond the broadcast cap in their reform
efforts.
In short order, however, this assumption was disproved, and the
debate took on a decidedly new cast. Unlike his counterpart,
Representative Billy Tauzin in the House, Senate Commerce
Chairman John McCain determined that legislation on the media
ownership rules deserved consideration in his committee. He
demonstrated that resolve by holding three hearings on media
72
ownership before the full committee in May. He called all of the
FCC commissioners before his committee on June 4 to explain their
decision, where they were “greeted with lengthy and occasionally
73
hostile questions.” Evidently he was dissatisfied with the answers.
On June 19, Senator McCain held a markup on the Stevens-Hollings
bill, even though he opposed it at that time. Various senators
amended the bill on a number of occasions. Senator Dorgan offered
the most important of these amendments; one that reinstated the
ban on cross-ownership, with a provision exempting firms in small
74
markets which could present evidence of financial hardship.
Senator McCain suggested another significant amendment; one that
changed the language in section 202(h) of the Telecommunications
75
Act of 1996. It clarified that section 202(h) was not a mandate for
71. Patriotic Reading, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Apr. 9, 2003, at A8.
72. Mike Sunnucks, Murdoch Makes Case Before McCain Committee, BUS. J., May 22,
2003, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/stories/2003/05/19/daily
52.html.
73. Ted Leventhal, Telecommunications—Senate Panel Weights Media Ownership
Limits, CONGRESS DAILYAM, June 16, 2003, at http://nationaljournal.com/cgibin/ifetch4?ENG+CONGRESS+7-cd0097+1091444-REVERSE+0+0+32520+F+1+1+1+
Leventhal+AND+PDf06f16f2003de06f16f2003 (on file with the American University
Law Review).
74. Id.
75. S. 1264, 108th Cong. (2003).
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deregulation, as the courts ruled and Chairman Powell maintained,
but rather a statement of congressional intent that the FCC was to
loosen or tighten ownership rules as deemed necessary to serve the
76
77
public interest.
The bill was reported out of committee.
This
78
It now
committee vote transformed the Stevens-Hollings bill.
resembled the Sanders bill more than Burr-Dingell. After the
committee vote, Commissioner Copps called on Chairman Powell to
stay the implementation of the rule changes in light of the Senate’s
79
action.
This proved a pivotal turn of events. It was one thing for
Representative Sanders to introduce a comprehensive rollback bill in
the House and pick up a handful of Republican cosponsors. It was
quite another for a similar bill to pass out of Senator McCain’s
Commerce Committee with the support of Senators Ted Stevens,
Trent Lott, Elizabeth Dole, and Olympia Snowe. The congressional
response to the June 2 ruling was no longer a targeted attack on the
broadcast cap at the behest of the NAB. It was a bipartisan reaction
to public outrage that spoke to a much more sweeping agenda aimed
not only at reversing ownership rules, but visiting deep inquiry upon
the nature of media regulation in general.
Public participants applauded the senators for the move to
broaden the debate. Tens of thousands of citizens were now
contacting members of Congress on a regular basis, phoning in
support for particular bills and instructions on particular votes. On
some occasions, offices received dozens of calls on the topic in a
given day, an enormous number for most congressional offices;
particularly on an issue that had never before resonated in popular
politics.
The NAB responded to the amending of Stevens-Hollings by
80
reversing its position in the debate. They now endorsed the FCC
ruling and began lobbying against any rule changes. This reversal
seemed to preclude any chance that the House Energy and
Commerce Committee would mark up any media ownership
legislation. A spokesman for Representative Tauzin made the
76. Id. § 4.
77. S. Rep. No. 108-140 (2003).
78. The committee vote was thirteen yeas to ten nays. Id.
79. Press Release, FCC, FCC Commissioner Copps Calls on FCC to Stay Media
Ownership Decision Pending Congressional Deliberation (June 19, 2003), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-235628A1.pdf.
80. See Joseph C. Anselmo, Focus on Media Ownership Issue Takes Lawmakers by
Surprise, CQ WKLY., July 12, 2003, at 1742-43 (noting the NAB’s disappointment at the
retreat from a rule that would allow cross-ownership of newspapers and television
stations in the same market, a rule that the NAB endorsed).
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committee’s position clear in June: “The media ownership issue has
become a political soap opera. Given the chance, Chairman Tauzin
81
plans to cancel its run.” He was backed up in his intent to bottle the
issue in committee by powerful House Majority Leader Tom DeLay.
On July 9, Representative Delay said, “I do not think the FCC went far
enough . . . . We should be unregulating instead of regulating
82
people’s right to own property and business.”
Nonetheless, the
departure of the NAB and the denunciation from Representatives
Tauzin and DeLay did not cause the storm to blow over. It
intensified. The public interest groups won a victory in the Senate
Commerce Committee, and they redoubled organizing efforts.
On July 15, Senators Dorgan and Lott, a most unlikely pairing,
opened a second front by introducing a new measure; a
83
congressional veto.
Under the provisions of the Congressional
Review Act (CRA), Congress could pass a “resolution of disapproval,”
84
effectively nullifying any ruling by a federal agency. The CRA had
been used only once before, and its chances of passing the Senate
seemed slim. However, it enjoyed certain advantages. First, it was a
simple message; total reversal. It presented a standard bearer for
organizing public pressure that was easy to understand. The public
pressure and media attention generated by the CRA threat would be
used to drum up more support and momentum for the new,
revamped Stevens-Hollings bill. Second, the CRA did not suffer from
the procedural problems that burdened a normal bill. Even if
Stevens-Hollings were to pass the Senate, which was by no means
clear since Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN) opposed its
85
consideration on the Senate floor, the House seemed unlikely to
86
move a similar bill through committee.
Without Representative
Tauzin’s acquiescence, there would be no future for Stevens-Hollings,
despite the importance of its markup.
The CRA resolution would not need approval from Senator Frist or
Representative Tauzin. According to the rules of the CRA, a
81. Ted Leventhal, Telecommunications—FCC Media Rule’s Hill Opponents Vow To
Keep Up Fight, CONGRESS DAILY, June 24, 2003, at http://nationaljournal.com/cgibin/ifetch4?ENG+CONGRESS+7-cd0097+1098605-REVERSE+0+0+32746+F+1+1+1+
Leventhal+AND+PDf06f24f2003de06f24f2003 (on file with the American University
Law Review) (quotations omitted).
82. Anselmo, supra note 80, at 1743 (quotations omitted).
83. Congress Moves to Overturn New Media Ownership Rules, ONLINE NEWS HOUR, July
16, 2003, at http://wwwpbs.org/newshour/media/media_watch/july-dec03/
fccresolution_9-1.html (on file with the American University Law Review).
84. Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. § 802(a) (2004).
85. See Anselmo, supra note 80, at 1743 (stating that Senator Frist, as of July 9,
“had not yet considered scheduling of the bill”).
86. See Leventhal, supra note 81 (discussing Republican opposition to the bill).
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resolution could be forcibly brought to the floor with a petition
bearing the signatures of thirty senators. As Stevens-Hollings had
thirty-two cosponsors at that point, this seemed easily within reach.
Moreover, if the Senate passed the CRA, it would not be referred to
the House Energy and Commerce Committee like a typical Senate
resolution. It would stay at the Speaker of the House’s desk. Though
Representative Dennis Hastert (R-IL) did not indicate that he would
grant the measure a vote, it would certainly be much closer to the
House floor than if it had to first bypass Representative Tauzin’s
committee and then get the Speaker’s approval.
The CRA
represented the possibility that a majority of members could execute
an end-run around the GOP leadership.
The introduction of the CRA provoked a rapid response.
Newspaper publishers, network broadcasters, and the NAB turned up
the lobbying pressure. The steady flow of cosponsors to StevensHollings, Burr-Dingell, and the Sanders bill began to dry up as more
cautious representatives opted to stand clear of the fray. For the
moment, Representative Tauzin served as an effective roadblock.
According to the provisions of the CRA, the resolution would have to
sit in the Commerce Committee for twenty calendar days before it
could be discharged to the floor. That deadline would expire during
Congress’ August recess. September was presumed to be the next
opportunity for further action on media ownership.
Once again, however, the political pressure did not abate. The
following day, July 16, the issue spilled over into yet another avenue:
the appropriations process. The action returned to the House, where
the appropriations bills were to be addressed first. The strategy
involved attaching a limitation amendment, also called a rider, to the
87
Commerce, Justice, State (“CJS”) Appropriations Bill.
The
amendment would prohibit the FCC from using any appropriated
funds to implement its June 2 rules, thus effectively blocking them for
one fiscal year. Unlike in the Energy and Commerce Committee,
Chairman Bill Young (R-FL) could not refuse to consider the CJS
Appropriations Bill, which like all appropriations measures is mustpass legislation containing tens of billions of dollars in spending.
Furthermore, there appeared to be a sizeable block of Republicans
willing to support a Democratic amendment to rollback at least the
broadcast cap rule, led by the influential chairman of the CJS
subcommittee, Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA). Attaching one or
87. See Anselmo, supra note 80, at 1743 (noting that an amendment could be
considered on July 21).
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more media ownership amendments to the CJS bill in committee
might result in securing majority support on the floor, despite the
opposition of House leadership. Such a victory in the House would
almost certainly produce a similar result in the Senate, where support
for a rollback was even stronger. GOP leaders moved to reign in
their errant members and cut off this potential challenge before it
could materialize.
They had their first opportunity in the run-up to the full
committee markup of the CJS appropriations bill in the House. This
was the first vote that mattered politically. If House appropriations
passed limitation amendments on FCC rules, the Senate would likely
follow suit. If they arrived at the President’s desk, it would place him
in a difficult position. Either he would use his first ever veto to reject
a massive appropriations measure (which White House advisors had
88
publicly recommended), or he would accept the media ownership
reversals. Such a chain of events was certainly not guaranteed, but its
very possibility made the House committee vote important. The fact
that rank-and-file House Republicans on that committee might be
willing to support the amendments is nothing short of remarkable,
given the repercussions it would visit upon their party leaders. The
only explanation is a sincere desire to open up the debate on the
future of media policy to an entirely different set of principles.
Representative Paul Gillmor (R-OH) summarized the situation he
and his colleagues faced saying, “‘I have great respect for Billy Tauzin
and Tom DeLay and Speaker Hastert. But on this issue, I don’t agree
89
with them. I think the public interest is in the other position.’”
On the morning of July 16, the House Appropriations Committee
met to consider the CJS Appropriations Bill. In the audience portion
of the committee hearing room were dozens of broadcast executives
who had spent the previous two days pushing hard for a flat rejection
of ownership amendments. Representative Tauzin was in the halls
that morning, leaning on Republicans to defeat the measure. It
seemed that the votes for rule reversal might not be there. Yet, when
ranking Democrat David Obey (D-WI) introduced an amendment to
block the forty-five percent broadcast cap, a number of Republicans
spoke up in support. Eleven voted with the Democrats, and the rider
90
passed forty to twenty-five. GOP committee members had voted
88. Steinberg, supra note 58 (quoting White House spokeswoman Claire
Buchan’s statement that “the president’s senior advisors would recommend a veto” if
a bill including that amendment were presented reached the president).
89. Anselmo, supra note 80, at 1743.
90. Now with Bill Moyers (PBS television broadcast, July 25, 2003), at
http://www.pbs.org/now/transcript/transcript229_full.html (on file with the
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their conscience, responding to the argument that concentrated
broadcast ownership would reduce local control over programming.
Representative Wolf commented later on his defection that, “I did
not get elected to be a potted plant, and I don’t care what the White
91
House thinks.” Representative Tauzin’s spokesman, Ken Johnson,
acknowledged the defeat but predicted what was to come, saying,
“[w]e may have one hand tied behind our back, but as long as we
92
have one free hand, we can still swing a bat.”
CJS went to the floor on July 22. The debate that afternoon was
93
heated and the tactics complex. In the days between the markup
and the floor vote, many insiders presumed that the Republican
leaders would attempt to strip Representative Obey’s amendment
from the bill and crush any further amendments offered to block the
new rules on cross-ownership and local television mergers.
Democrats raced to protect the rider that was already in the bill by
reaching out to GOP supporters of Burr-Dingell.
They also
discouraged liberal Democrats who wanted to offer a cross-ownership
rider on the theory that reaching for two amendments might result in
the loss of both in the eventual conference committee. If all the
chips were bet just on the Obey amendment, it might survive the
process and become law. The realities of the advancing legislation in
the teeth of the majority leadership forced some Democrats to limit
their goals to the reversal of the broadcast cap.
The floor debate played out quite differently than expected. The
Republicans said nothing about the Obey amendment, presumably
because they lacked the votes to remove it. The debate then centered
around an amendment, offered by Representatives Maurice Hinchey
(D-NY), David Price (D-NC), and Jay Inslee (D-WA) (Hinchey
amendment). This amendment blocked the two other major rule
changes, the lifting of the cross-ownership ban and the relaxation of
limits on local TV mergers, in an effort to test how much support
94
existed for a comprehensive rule reversal. Many members felt that
without legislation addressing the cross-ownership rule, which would
American University Law Review).
91. CAPITOL BROADCASTING COMPANY, CONGRESS IMPLEMENTS TOOLS TO BLOCK
FCC’S JUNE RULING, July 21, 2003, at http://www.cbc-raleigh.com/capcom/news/
2003/corporate_03/fcc_congress/fcc_congress.htm (on file with the American
University Law Review) (quotations omitted).
92. Brody Mullins, FCC Decision Dealt Big Blow, ROLL CALL, July 17, 2003, at 24.
93. See Understanding Tuesday’s House Vote, FREE PRESS, July 23, 2003 [hereinafter
Tuesday’s House Vote], at http://chicagomediawatch.org/fcc_freepress.html (on file
with the American University Law Review) (detailing the split between House
Republicans and the President’s veto threat that preceded it).
94. Nichols, supra note 6, at 36.
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produce far more sweeping changes in the media system than an
increased broadcast cap, the heart of the debate would be lost. They
also assumed that the Hinchey amendment would fail for lack of
Republican votes. The question was by how much. If it got 150 votes
or more, then the House would have demonstrated respectable
support for a full rollback and opened the door for Senate action on
cross-ownership. Less than 150 votes would all but end hope of
reversal of the cross-ownership rule.
In the hours before the vote, activist groups mobilized and
launched the largest call-in campaign of the year. Within two hours
of the roll call, practically every phone in every House office was
ringing. It was an impressive scene, as Americans who had never
heard of an appropriations rider called to demand that their
representatives support one. Representative David Price, moved by
the action said in his speech on the House floor, “Mr. Chairman, in
the history of media policy, there has never been a moment when the
95
public was more engaged than they are right now.” Representative
Edward Markey (D-MA), a twenty-seven-year veteran of the
telecommunications subcommittee, blasted the FCC ruling in the
harshest terms, calling it “the worst decision ever made by the Federal
96
Communications Commission.”
Despite this show of support, the Democrats were divided.
Representatives Obey and Dingell, key Democratic leaders, spoke
against the Hinchey amendment during the floor debate. They felt
they had a winner if they marshaled all defenses around the
broadcast cap, but a cross-ownership amendment would be a political
overreach. Representative Obey began his speech by praising the
principles behind a full rule reversal, but he warned that “[t]he
Hinchey amendment is not intended to be so, but it is a killer
amendment. It will load up the camel, and it will break the camel’s
97
back.”
The Hinchey amendment was defeated 254 to 174.
Sixty
Democrats voted against the amendment and thirty-four Republicans
98
voted for it. Shockingly, had the Democrats held their ground, the
measure would have passed easily. Few Democrats thought that
almost three dozen GOP members would vote for the amendment,
yet they were now on the record. Democratic tactics doomed the
Hinchey amendment. It was now clear that if a straight up-or-down
95.
96.
97.
98.

149 CONG. REC. H7280 (daily ed. July 22, 2003) (statement of Rep. Price).
149 CONG. REC. H7287 (daily ed. July 22, 2003) (statement of Rep. Markey).
149 CONG. REC. H7279 (daily ed. July 22, 2003) (statement of Rep. Obey).
Tuesday’s House Vote, supra note 93.
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vote on the full set of rules came to the House floor, a reversal would
very likely succeed. For the moment, the Hinchey amendment
achieved a respectable vote tally, well above expectations. Moreover,
the renewed wave of public support emboldened reform-minded
Senators who now saw that the cross-ownership issue was still in play.
When the amended CJS bill passed the House by a vote of 400 to
twenty-one, it made the front page of the New York Times and the
99
Washington Post. The Democrats apparently stole a victory from the
Republican leadership in the House. What the Los Angeles Times
described as a “sudden change in political currents” put the outcome
100
of Chairman Powell’s rule changes in serious doubt. Several of the
Democratic presidential candidates, including Howard Dean, John
Edwards, John Kerry, and Dennis Kucinich, responded by publicly
101
voicing support of more progressive media policy. But, this was not
a case of purely liberal activism. The White House renewed its veto
threat, and the Republican leadership began to mobilize political
102
defenses.
Throughout the next few weeks, while Congress was in recess, the
political battle was waged in the press and in lobbying visits. The
NAB switched their position again. Realizing that an appropriations
rider on the broadcast cap would provide the one-rule-only reversal
they could support, the association put their lobbying strength
103
behind it.
Troubled GOP leaders began circulating a letter
promising the President that a veto of the media ownership rules
104
would be sustained by the House.
Knowing that 146 votes would
block a veto override, the Republicans sought that number of
supporters. But the letter failed to solicit the required number of
105
votes.
A White House spokesman was unfazed saying, “‘In every
instance the administration has issued a veto threat, the [offending]
106
provision has been changed or dropped.’”
99. Stephen Labaton, F.C.C. Media Rule Blocked in House in a 400-to-21 Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 2003, at A1; Christopher Stern & Jonathan Krim, House Votes to Prevent
Change in Media Rule, WASH. POST, July 24, 2003, at A1.
100. Richard Simon & Janet Hook, FCC Rule May Bring a Veto Standoff, L.A. TIMES,
July 25, 2003, at C1.
101. Labaton, supra note 99, at A1.
102. Frank James, Bush Threatens Veto to Keep FCC Changes, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 12,
2003, at C10.
103. Susan Crabtree, NAB will fight FCC, Variety, July 28, 2003, at 28.
104. See House Republicans Fail to Rally Media Bill Opposition, FREE PRESS, July 31,
2003 (online version), (noting that Republican Congressman Chris Cannon drafted
and circulated the letter), at http://www.freepress.net/news/article.php?id=809 (on
file with American University Law Review).
105. Id.
106. Simon & Hook, supra note 100, at C1.
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In late July, the New York Times published an editorial by Chairman
107
On August 20, Chairman
Powell attacking critics as misguided.
Powell announced that the FCC would be launching a “Localism in
Broadcasting” initiative, a taskforce aimed at collecting public
108
testimony on the local public service of broadcasters.
Despite the
apparent relevance of this initiative as a corrective to the furor over
June 2, he declined to stay the rule changes. Commissioner Copps
109
called it “a policy of ‘ready, fire, aim!’”
On the day Congress
reconvened in early September, Republican pollster Frank Luntz
released survey numbers in full page ads in the Capitol Hill
newspapers. His data, distributed to every congressional office,
purported to show that the American public rejected government
regulation of media. His message stated that, “America Says: Don’t
110
Get Between Me and My TV.”
The political volume of FCC supporters was lowered substantially
on that same day, September 3, by an event which almost no one
predicted. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued an
111
order in the case of Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC.
The suit, filed
by a small group of community radio activists and argued by public
interest attorneys of the Media Access Project, asked for a stay on the
implementation of the media ownership rules. FCC and industry
lawyers for broadcasters such as Fox, NBC and Viacom, defended the
112
rules. The Court granted the stay. It was a stunning victory for the
coalition of policy reformers. The Wall Street Journal reported that the
tiny non-profit law firm “bested legal teams from the FCC and three
113
of the nation’s broadcast networks.” By earning a stay, the lawyers
107. Michael K. Powell, New Rules, Old Rhetoric, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2003, at A17
(“[T]he current debate has ignored a disturbing trend the new rules will do much to
abate: the movement of high-quality content from free over-the-air broadcast
television to cable and satellite.”). To support his point, Powell point to the mass
movement of most sports content and to the number of Emmy nominations earned
by HBO. Id.
108. Press Release, FCC, FCC Chairman Powell Launches “Localism in
Broadcasting” Initiative (Aug. 20, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_
public/attachmatch/DOC-238057A1.pdf.
109. Press Release, FCC, Copps Criticizes Willingness To Let Media Consolidation
Continue (Aug. 20, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/DOC-238079A1.pdf.
110. Memorandum from Luntz Research Companies, Why Americans Support the
FCC Decision (Sept. 3, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review).
111. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, No. 03-3388, 2003 WL 22052896, at *1 (3d
Cir. Sept. 3, 2003).
112. See id. (“Given the magnitude of this matter and the public’s interest in
reaching the proper resolution, a stay is warranted pending thorough and efficient
judicial review.”).
113. Yochi J. Dreazen, No-Frills Fighter Stuns the FCC, Media Goliaths, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 5, 2003, at B1.
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at Media Access Project opened a window for congressional action.
Although the case would not be decided until at least the spring of
2004, this legal win represented perhaps the single most successful
effort of the reform campaign. If the rules were implemented, the
prospect for a legislative rollback or compromise would have
dimmed. It is one thing for Congress to nullify rule changes which
remain hypothetical; it is quite another to reverse new ownership
regulations that have already permitted further consolidation and
mergers.
On September 11, 2003 Senators Dorgan and Lott held a press
conference to announce that they would force a vote on the CRA
114
resolution of disapproval. MoveOn.org presented 300,000 petitions
115
of support to the Senators to drive home the point.
The debate
began that afternoon and continued on September 16. Senator John
McCain, who would vote against the CRA in the end, nonetheless had
this to say during the debate, “[i]n my time as chairman of the Senate
Commerce Committee, no issue has erupted so rapidly and evoked
116
He
such passion from the public as media consolidation.”
concluded that the CRA would likely pass the Senate that day, but
that it would die in the House. Indeed, he chided, that may be why
117
so many Senators felt that they could vote safely in favor of it.
The Senate CRA passed fifty-five to forty. The New York Times
described the vote as a “stinging political rebuke of Michael K.
Powell” while quoting Chairman Powell as describing the vote as
118
“‘bordering on the absurd.’”
Chairman Powell complained that
“there was a concerted grass-roots effort to attack the commission
119
from the outside in.” Indeed, as over two million members citizens
from a broad cross-section of society contacted Washington
regulators and lawmakers to voice their protest. This was the highwater mark for the effort to reverse the rules.
Given the political unlikelihood of the House leadership bringing
the Senate CRA resolution to a vote, members of Congress assumed
114. See James, supra note 102, at C10.
115. Senators Lott and Dorgan hold news conference calling for rollback of FCC media
consolidation rules, FREE PRESS (Sept. 11, 2003) (online version), at http://www.
freepress.net/news/article.php?id=1117 (on file with the American University Law
Review). The National Rifle Association also collected 300,000 signatures of support
by postcard. Id.
116. 149 CONG. REC. S11,507 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2003) (statement of Sen.
McCain).
117. Id.
118. Stephen Labaton, F.C.C. Plan to Ease Curbs on Big Media Hits Senate Snag, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2003, at A1.
119. Stephen Labaton, F.C.C. Chief Talks of Frustration and Surprise, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 2003, at C1.
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that the fifty-five to forty record would serve to put considerable
pressure on the most viable of the three legislative strategies to pass a
rollback of the FCC rules; the CJS appropriations bill. On September
4, the Senate Appropriations Committee quietly approved the CJS
bill. It did not even vote on an FCC rider. Senator Stevens attached
the broadcast cap reversal as a manager’s amendment before it came
before the committee, using precisely the same language as the
House bill to make it more difficult to strip it out in the conference
120
committee. Members understood that Senator Dorgan would offer
his cross-ownership amendment when the CJS bill was debated on the
floor. Since fifty-five votes had been collected for a nullification of
the entire June 2 ruling, it was thought probable that the votes could
be gathered to pass such an amendment. It was, however, far from
certain whether any amendments concerning the FCC, much less a
cross-ownership amendment passed only by the Senate, could survive
a conference committee under heavy pressure from the White House
to remove the language.
As the fall wore on, the Senate CJS bill looked increasingly unlikely
to even have a floor vote. Its fate was wrapped up together with
several other controversial spending bills in an omnibus package.
The omnibus carries the weight of a must-pass bill. But, the bill
would have little opportunity for further amendment since Senator
Dorgan would not have the chance to offer an amendment blocking
cross-ownership. Further, the omnibus negotiations would allow
much stronger influence from the White House as even the broadcast
cap was in danger of being stripped out. In the back channels of
Senate power, the tides were turning against reform legislation.
When appropriations negotiations languished in October,
attention returned to the CRA—which was then on the Speaker’s
desk in the House—GOP leadership called the resolution “dead on
121
arrival.”
As McCain predicted, the CRA was turning into a
showpiece vote, not a substantive action. But, the House was not
finished. Led once again by Representatives Sanders and Hinchey, a
new coalition was cobbled together. The goal was to get signatures
on a letter to the Speaker of the House calling for an immediate vote
on the Senate CRA. House rules placed the decision in the Speaker’s
hands as to whether a vote would be held or not. Once more a public
call-in campaign encouraged members to sign on. By late October,
120. Labaton, supra note 32, at C1.
121. Katherine Mangu-Ward, Shut-Up, They Explained: Congress Draws a Bead on
Talk Radio, WKLY. STANDARD, Sept. 29, 2003, at 17 (quoting House majority leader
Tom DeLay) (quotations omitted).
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205 members of the House, including eleven Republicans, signed the
122
Though 205 votes is
letter in support of a vote on the measure.
short of the 218 required majority, it was a clear statement to the
leadership that the resolution would pass if it were to have a vote. Many
of the thirty-four Republican votes cast in July in favor of the Hinchey
amendment could be counted on for the CRA. The formerly divided
Democrats were now all but fully aligned behind a comprehensive
reversal. Consequently, Representative Hastert declined to bring the
CRA to the House floor. It would remain on his desk when the
session ended in December. Supporters vowed to introduce a House
version of the CRA and force a vote using a discharge petition in
123
2004.
Meanwhile, with the issue back in the limelight, the pressure was
on the Senate appropriators to hold the line on the thirty-five percent
broadcast cap in the omnibus bill, which finally entered the closing
stages of consideration on a lengthy conference report. Bipartisan
conferees agreed to keep the language in the bill. But, at the
eleventh hour in late November, Senator Stevens met with White
House counsel and reopened the issue. They emerged with a new
deal. Senator Hollings (D-SC) blasted the action stating: “The
Republicans went into a closet, met with themselves, and announced
a ‘compromise.’ . . . It was a total violation of the conference
124
agreement.”
The new deal went beyond adjusting percentages. The broadcast
cap would be set at thirty-nine percent permanently, not as a one-year
appropriations rider. Further, the FCC’s biennial review period
would be extended to quadrennial, thus easing the burden of
constant review. The new thirty-nine percent rule would no longer
be considered in these reviews. These provisions, in and of
themselves, seemed a positive solution. However, there appeared to
be loopholes. Any company could violate the thirty-nine percent
limit for two years without penalty before being forced to sell stations,
up from a standard of six to twelve months. Moreover, the FCC’s
122. Press Release, Rep. Bernard Saunders, Bipartisan Coalition of House
Members Demand Vote on FCC Media Regulations (Nov. 5, 2003), at
http://bernie.house.gov/documents/releases/2003/105175717.asp (on file with the
American University Law Review).
123. See Klaus Marre, Discharge petition looms over FCC rules, THE HILL, Sept. 23, 2003
(online edition), available at http://www.stopmediaregulation.org/articles/
092303th.htm (on file with the American University Law Review).
124. Press Release, Sen. Fritz Hollings, Republican’s Media Ownership Agreement
a ‘Total Violation’ of Conference (Nov. 25, 2003) (quotations omitted), at
http://hollings.senate.gov/~hollings/press/2003B25547.html (on file with the
American University Law Review).
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authority to grant a waiver to the thirty-nine percent was not explicitly
removed. Indeed, the new legislative language was written in such a
way as to make unclear who had the legal authority to change the
125
rule.
Critics of the new language charged that it provided the pretense
of public interest regulation while signaling to the industry that
consolidation could proceed. Some critics questioned the thirty-nine
percent limit. Viacom and News Corp. stood in violation of the thirtyfive percent limit, at thirty-nine percent and thirty-eight percent,
126
respectively. The compromise simply legalized the status quo, and
127
the NAB endorsed it. Rupert Murdoch, the iconic leader of News
128
Corp., acknowledged that the deal “‘suits us just fine.’”
Conversely, the thirty-nine percent compromise satisfied few
others. Critics viewed it as a carefully tailored solution that fit the
needs of powerful corporations.
It contained loopholes that
129
suggested the “permanency” of the limit was temporary. It did not
address the more substantial rule changes, cross-ownership and local
television consolidation. Moreover, the process was heavily political.
Essentially, two powerful Republicans colluded and came to an
arrangement, without consulting with anyone, much less a vote
before a relevant committee. Additionally, there was little in this
solution which spoke to the new policy directives sought by the
coalition. This was a top-down solution which massaged the details of
technocratic regulation for political purposes, not a reevaluation of
the process and principles behind public accountability in ownership
rules. Many critics found it hard to avoid the conclusion that money
won out over the public interest in this contest, especially since the
broadcasters walked away with a reasonable deal and the public was
left with next to nothing.

125. Opponents viewed the compromise as designed specifically to give media
companies exactly what they wanted. See, e.g., Frank Ahrens, Democrats Decry
‘Compromise’ on FCC Rule, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 2003, at E1 (quoting the view of a
Consumer Union spokesman that the compromise was “a backroom deal to let the
two largest networks keep all their stations).
126. Id.
127. Edmund Sanders, Deal on TV Cap Fractures Coalition, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2003,
at C1.
128. Ahrens, supra note 125, at E1.
129. See Mark Wigfield, Congress gifts FCC with Fewer Reviews on Media Ownership,
FREE PRESS, Dec. 1, 2003 (online version), (describing an appeals court decision that
found that because the original limit of thirty-five percent could be raised or
repealed, that the new limit of thirty-nine percent could be altered as well), at
http://www.freepress.net/news/article.php?id=1826 (on file with the American
University Law Review).
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Despite considerable opposition, the omnibus bill containing the
130
thirty-nine percent deal passed the House on December 8, 2003.
The media ownership rules were a sticking point in the debate, but
the omnibus carried so many contentious issues that the failure of
this compromise was only a part of the chorus of dissent. The Senate
did not consider the omnibus bill before closing the session for the
year due to intense conflict over the legislation. The Senate will
consider it in late January 2004, but its passage is by no means
certain. Numerous provisions in the bill have provoked opposition,
particularly those concerning the thirty-nine percent compromise.
Senator Dorgan fumed: “I, and others who have fought so hard to
overturn these rules, will not sit quietly by while the White House
131
insists on provisions that are counter to the public’s interest.”
CONCLUSION
Heading into 2004, the legislative vehicles for reversing the FCC’s
media ownership rules are all still alive. Burr-Dingell and the Sanders
bill sit in committee with 194 and 100 cosponsors, respectively.
Stevens-Hollings, with forty-seven cosponsors, is out of committee and
awaits floor consideration. A House version of the CRA resolution
has been introduced and it promises to be advanced aggressively by
132
frustrated supporters. And, of course, the omnibus appropriations
bill must still move through the Senate. All of these are likely to kick
up considerable political dust in the first few months of 2004.
However, none of these are particularly likely to bear fruit as
substantial reversals of the FCC rules or as major changes of policy
direction in the short term. The thirty-nine percent compromise will
likely withstand pressure from both sides and remain as it is in the
final bill. Only the pending court case in the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit is likely to stop the FCC rules from going into effect
next year.
The difficulty of passing the rollback and the circuitous methods of
appropriations and the resolution of disapproval belie the political
realities of Congress. Good policy with majority support has no
guarantee of passage if the leadership stands opposed. Recall that
the reversal of media concentration is an issue that the vast majority
of Americans agree on. It is not a partisan issue. It is hardly
130. 149 CONG. REC. H12,845 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2003) (statement of Rep. Bill
Young).
131. Ahrens, supra note 126, at E1 (quotations omitted).
132. H.R.J. Res. 72, 108th Cong. (2003). The bill was introduced by Rep. Maurice
Hinchey and has fifty-five cosponsors.
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contentious. It is the subject of debate in the Congress only because
powerful interests stand to lose a great deal of money if the public’s
work is done. Yet, the House leadership derailed the measure
without too much difficulty. As the Speaker of the House expressed
in a recent speech:
Sometimes, we have a hard time convincing the majority of the
House to vote like a majority of the House, . . . On occasion, a
particular issue might excite a majority made up mostly of the
minority. . . . The job of Speaker is not to expedite legislation that
133
runs counter to the wishes of the majority of his majority.

On the question of media ownership, as well as almost every other
issue in the first session of the 108th Congress, he found a way to
leverage political power to defeat policy opponents.
Does this mean that a progressive media reform is dead in the long
term? Quite the opposite. What happened in the last six months of
2003 was nothing short of a transformation in the nature of media
policy making because there is now an actual debate on the topic.
There is a bona fide alternative policy position which emanates from
a new, publicly vitalized agenda of public service standards and
market controls. Millions of Americans participated in the debate
and convinced the majority of members of Congress that the
prevailing trends of concentrated power in the media system should
be reversed. What this issue accomplished in six months usually takes
years on Capitol Hill. That the reformers did not achieve a legislative
victory was a matter of politics.
Politics cannot stop this issue from recurring in the next session of
Congress or undo the exposure of the FCC’s practice of conducting
important media policy debates behind closed doors and outside the
public debate. Nor can politics prevent the energy and public
attention spawned in the media ownership campaign from spilling
over into other media issues, such as low-power radio, Internet
governance, public service obligations for digital broadcasting,
children’s programming, free political airtime, and a host of other
topics from spectrum allocation to copyright reform. According to
the trade publication Communications Daily, industry analysts, political
insiders, and public service advocates all agree on one thing after the
ownership fight, “it seems clear that the impact of the issue on

133. Rep. J. Dennis Hastert, Reflections on the Role of the Speaker in the Modern
Day House of Representatives, Address at the Library of Congress (Nov. 12, 2003), at
http://speaker.house.gov/library/misc/031112reflect.shtml (on file with the
American University Law Review).
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Capitol Hill has surprised many and seems likely to carry over into
134
other media issues.”

134. Terry Lane & Michael Feazel, Cause Celeb—Media Ownership Issue Could Have
Long Legacy, COMM. DAILY, Aug. 8, 2003, 2003 WL 5755999.

